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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
The last article discussed the crimes of murder and ag-
gravated murder, as well as the legal definitions of birth and 
death. See 3 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice 
Criminal Law ch. 95 (1996). This article examines other 
types of homicides and causation issues. 
COMMON LAW 
Voluntary Manslaughter 
At common law, voluntary manslaughter was defined as 
an intentional killing of a person upon adequate provoca-
tion. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.1 0 
(1986). The killing must have occurred while the offender 
was subject to a sudden heat of passion, for which there 
had not been a sufficient "cooling off" period. The common 
law courts were restrictive in recognizing circumstances · 
where the provocation was deemed adequate. Often, 
provocation was limited to two instances: (1) where the ac-
cused reacted to a battery or mutual combat, and (2) where 
the accused discovered his spouse in bed with another 
man. "Mere words" were not considered adequate provoca-
tion; this rule was later modified to permit the jury to decide 
the issue. 
Involuntary Manslaughter 
At common law, involuntary manslaughter included two 
types of homicides. The first involved a death caused by 
"criminal negligence:'ld. § 7.12. The courts were divided 
over whether this offense required recklessness (a subjec-
tive awareness of the risk of death) or gross negligence (an 
objective standard based upon whether a reasonable per-
son would have been aware of the risk). There was, howev-
er, general agreement that involuntary manslaughter re-
quired more culpability than simple negligence, the civil tort 
standard. Typical examples of involuntary manslaughter in-
cluded drunk driving and drag racing. 
The second type of involuntary manslaughter involved 
the "unlawful act" doctrine or "misdemeanor-manslaughter 
rule:' I d. § 7 .13. This offense was analogous to the felony-
murder rule; a killing during the commission of a misde-
meanor was manslaughter. Frequently, this offense was 
limited by requiring that the misdemeanor be malum in se, 
or if malum prohibitum, that the death be foreseeable. 
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
Voluntary manslaughter proscribes knowingly causing 
the death of another under the influence of sudden passion 
or in a sudden fit of rage brought on by serious provocation 
reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly 
force. R.C. 2903.03(A). "The element of provocation miti-
gates the offender's culpability:' State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 
24, 37,553 N.E.2d 576 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 
(1990). See also State v. Huertas, 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 
N.E.2d 1058 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 336 (1991 ); 
State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 371 N.E.2d 831 (1977). 
Sudden Passion or Rage 
The 197 4 Criminal Code adopted the Model Penal 
Code's approach, using the phrase "extreme emotional 
stress" to expand the circumstances in which murder could 
be reduced to voluntary manslaughter: "[llhe former of-
fense of voluntary manslaughter contemplated killings done 
in a sudden fit of rage or passion. This section includes 
such killings, but also includes homicides done while under 
extreme emotional stress which may be the result of a build-
up of stress over a period of time:· Legislative Service 
Commission (1973). 
The statute was amended in 1982, substituting the pre-
sent language, "sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage," 
for the phrase "extreme emotional stress:· The amendment 
reflected a legislative reconsideration of its 197 4 decision to 
expand voluntary manslaughter to include homicides com-
mitted under extreme emotional stress, which could develop 
over a period of time. Even before the amendment, the 
Ohio Supreme Court had reduced the impact of the "ex-
treme emotional stress" language by ruling that the act must 
be performed under the influence of sudden passion or in 
the heat of blood, without time for reflection or for passions 
to cool. State v. Muscatello, 55 Ohio St.2d 201, 378 N.E.2d 
738 (1977). 
Consequently, the issues raised under the amended 
statute are the same as those that existed in the pre-197 4 
statute: (1) whether the provocation was adequate, (2) 
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whether the provocation triggered sudden passion or a sud-
den fit of rage, (3) whether the killing was a result of such 
provocation, and (4) whether the killing occurred before a 
reasonable "cooling-off" time had elapsed. 
Provocation By The Victim 
Under the Ohio statute, the provocation must be caused 
by the victim. State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 
272 (1992). An offender who kills the victim because he is 
provoked into a sudden rage by a third person does not 
qualify for manslaughter. See 2 LaFave & Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 7.1 O(g) (1986). 
Sufficient Provocation 
At common law, the courts were restrictive in recognizing 
circumstances where the provocation was deemed ade-
quate. Often, provocation was limited to two instances: (1) 
where the accused reacted to a battery or mutual combat, 
and (2) where the accused discovered his spouse in bed 
with another man. "Mere words" were not considered ade-
quate provocation. 
In Ohio, there is both an objective and a subjective as-
pect to the provocation requirement. The subjective compo-
nent focuses on whether the particular defendant was actu-
ally under the influence of a sudden passion or sudden fit. 
The objective component focuses on whether the provoca-
tion is sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary per-
son beyond the power of his or her control. ld. In most situ-
ations, words alone are not sufficient, even if one spouse in-
forms the other spouse of adultery. State v. Shane, 63 Ohio 
St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992). 
Cooling-Off Period 
What constitutes a reasonable time for passions to cool 
is typically a question for the trier of fact and is not a matter 
of law, unless (based on the evidence) reasonable persons 
could not differ as to what constitutes a reasonable time. 
State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St. 213, 118 N.E.2d 517 
(1954). A woman who shoots her husband as he lay sleep-
ing several hours after their last argument is not entitled to 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as there is no evi-
dence of suddenness. State v. Manning, 74 Ohio App.3d 19, 
598 N.E.2d 25 (1991 ). 
In State v. Mack, 82 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 694 N.E.2d 
1328 (1998), the Supreme Court commented: "[W]e find 
the evidence insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish 
provocation that is reasonably sufficient to incite the use of 
deadly force ... Mack testified that he had been told that 
Chris had made threats to him in the past. However, past 
incidents or verbal threats do not satisfy the test for reason-
ably sufficient provocation when there is sufficient time for 
cooling off. In this case, there is no evidence that any past 
incidents provoked appellee into a sudden passion or fit of 
rage ... Fear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of 
emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or 
fit of rage:· 
Burden of Proof 
In some jurisdictions, provocation is considered an ele-
ment of voluntary manslaughter and once raised at trial, the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ad-
equate provocation did not exist. Ohio, however, follows a 
different approach. In State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 
620, 590 N.E.2d 261 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled 
that "a defendant on trial for murder or aggravated murder 
bears the burden of persuading the fact finder, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that he or she acted under the in-
2 
fluences of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage:• In 
State v. Benge, 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 140,661 N.E.2d 1019 
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 888 (1996). the Court com-
mented that the statute "permits a defendant to mitigate a 
charge of aggravated murder or murder to manslaughter if 
the defendant establishes the mitigating circumstances" and 
the "jury should have been instructed to consider the miti-
gating evidence to determine whether appellant proved vol-
untary manslaughter:• In other words, the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter comprises elements which must be proven by 
the state and mitigating circumstances that the defendant 
must establish. State v. Crago, 93 Ohio App.3d 621, 639 
N.E.2d 801 (1994), app. dismissed, 70 Ohio St.3d 1413, 
637 N.E.2d 90 (1994). cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172 (1995). 
In a murder prosecution, the trial court misstated the law by 
stating that it was the state's burden to prove that the defen-
dant did not act under the influence of sudden passion or in 
a fit of rage. State v. Cuttiford, 93 Ohio App.3d 546, 639 
N.E.2d 472 (1994). 
The allocation of the burden of persuasion to the defen-
dant raises a constitutional issue in addition to the statutory 
issue. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that allocating the bur-
den of proving "heat of passion" to a homicide defendant vi-
olated due process. The Court viewed the "heat of passion" 
issue as an element of the crime as defined in Maine. 
Under Maine law, if the prosecution proved the homicide 
was both intentional and unlawful, "malice aforethoughf' 
was conclusively implied - unless the accused proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation, which could reduce the 
crime to manslaughter. 
Two years later, however, in Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197 (1977), the Court ruled that a New York law that al-
located the burden of proving an "extreme emotional distur-
bance" to a homicide defendant did not violate due process. 
The "extreme emotional disturbance" requirement is merely 
a modern formulation of the "heat of passion" rule; it re-
duces murder to manslaughter. The Court distinguished 
Wilbur on the grounds that Maine, but not New York, had de-
fined "malice aforethought" as an element of murder. As 
such, due process prohibited shifting the burden of persua-
sion on this element to the accused. This distinction was 
criticized as "formalistic" because a state remained free to 
define crimes in ways to avoid the Wilbur result. 2 
McCormick, Evidence§ 347, at 483 (4th ed. 1992). See 
also 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 1.8(b), at 
71 (1986) ("So the argument goes, if the state has it in its 
power to redefine the crime so as to transform an 'element' 
into an 'affirmative defense,' then there is no reason - other 
than excessive formalism -to prohibit the state from in-
stead leaving that particular in the statute as an element 
and merely assigning the burden of proof as to it to the de-
fendant:'). 
In State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 620, 590 N.E.2d 
261 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the allocation 
of the burden of persuasion to the defendant did not violate 
due process. 
Diminished Capacity 
"Provocation" is the only grounds in Ohio for reducing an 
intentional killing to manslaughter; the partial defense of di-
minished capacity is not recognized in Ohio. State v. Wilcox, 
70 Ohio St.2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982). See 3 Katz & 
Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law§ 87.16 
(1996) (diminished capacity). 
Accident Defense 
In State v. Lazich, 117 Ohio App.3d 477, 479, 690 N.E.2d 
977 (1997), app. dismissed, 78 Ohio St.3d 1512, 679 
e N.E.2d 308 (1997), the court of appeals held that the record 
supported "the defense theory that appellant accidently dis-
charged the pistol while attempting to protect himself from 
the decedent's attack. Therefore, the prosecution did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 'knowingly' 
caused the decedent's death:' 
Lesser-Included Offenses 
Voluntary manslaughter is technically not a lesser includ-
ed offense of murder, because it requires additional ele-
ments (mitigating circumstances) not included in the defini-
tion of murder. State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632, 590 
N.E.2d 272 (1992). It is a "lesser-degree offense" of murder. 
State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 617, 590 N.E.2d 261 
(1992) ("Voluntary manslaughter is ... an inferior degree of 
murder:'); State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 37, 553 N.E.2d 
576 (1990) ("As with lesser included offenses, a defendant 
is entitled to an instruction on an inferior degree of the in-
dicted offense when the evidence is such that a jury could 
both reasonably acquit him of the indicted offense and con-
vict him of the inferior offense:'); State v. Deem, 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294 (1 988) (syllabus, para. 2). 
If the jury in a murder trial finds that the defendant pur-
posely killed the victim, the crime is murder. If, however, the 
jury also finds that this killing was the product of sudden 
passion or sudden fit of rage brought about by serious 
provocation, the crime is voluntary manslaughter. 
If aggravated murder is charged, the jury may have three 
~ options: (1) A purposeful killing committed with prior calcu-
lation or design is aggravated murder; (2) A purposeful 
killing without prior calculation or design is murder; (3) A 
purposeful killing in a sudden heat of passion or fit of rage 
upon sufficient provocation is voluntary manslaughter. See 
Legislative Service Commission (1973). 
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
There are two types of involuntary manslaughter. 
Felonies as the Predicate Offense 
The first type is defined as proximately causing the death 
of another while committing or attempting to commit a 
felony. R.C. 2903.04(A) ("No person shall cause the death of 
another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or 
attempting to commit a felony:'). This provision includes 
felonious assault, State v. Morris, 1 05 Ohio App.3d 552, 
556, 664 N.E.2d 950 (1995) and child endangerment, State 
v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d 306,308-10,466 N.E.2d 860 
(1 984); State v. Evans, 93 Ohio App.3d 121, 637 N.E.2d 969 
(1994); State v. Legg, 89 Ohio App.3d 184, 187-88,623 
N.E.2d 1263 (1993). 
Misdemeanors as the Predicate Offense 
The second type of involuntary manslaughter is identical, 
except it involves a misdemeanor. R.C. 2903.04(8) (first, 
second, third, or fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor). At 
one time, the Ohio Supreme Court had ruled that a minor 
misdemeanor could not serve as the predicate offense for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 
115, 616 N.E.2d 224 (1993); State v. Kuhajda, 67 Ohio 
St.3d 450, 619 N.E.2d 1016 (1993). The statute, however, 
has since been amended. 
3 
In State v. Campbell, 117 Ohio App.3d 762, 766, 691 
N.E.2d 711 (1997), the court of appeals ruled the involun-
tary manslaughter statute unconstitutional if the underlying 
minor misdemeanor is a strict liability offense. In such a 
case, the punishment for manslaughter is grossly dispropor-
tionate and thus violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause. See also State v. Brown, 117 Ohio App.3d 6, 689 
N.E.2d 979 (1996) (rejecting an Equal Protection chal-
lenge), app. dismissed, 78 Ohio St.3d 1452, 677 N.E.2d 813 
(1996). 
Common Law 
The statute incorporates the common law unlawful act 
doctrine. See Legislative Service Commission (1973) ("This 
section defines an offense substantially equivalent to the 
former offense of involuntary manslaughter, except that for 
penalty purposes it distinguishes between homicides result-
ing from felonies and those resulting from misdemeanors:'). 
Common-law manslaughter, however, also included a 
death caused by criminal negligence (recklessness)- e.g., 
drunk driver fatality. There is no provision for this type of 
manslaughter in Ohio. Nevertheless, the Ohio negligent 
homicide and vehicular homicide statutes encompass much 
of the conduct that fell within this type of common-law invol-
untary manslaughter. 
Mens Rea 
No distinct culpable mental state need be proven for the 
element of death. State v. Tanner, 90 Ohio App.3d 761, 630 
N.E.2d 751 (1993). The culpable mental state is the intent 
to commit the underlying crime. State v. Campbell, 7 4 Ohio 
App.3d 352, 598 N.E.2d 1244 (1991 ), dismissed, 62 Ohio 
St.3d 1431, 578 N.E.2d 823 (1991 ); State v. Losey, 23 Ohio 
App.3d 93, 491 N.E.2d 379 (1985); Stanley v. Turner, 6 F.3d 
399 (6th Cir. 1993). 
Proximate Causation 
Proximate cause is required for culpability. The death 
must be directly associated with the underlying crime as 
part of one continuous transaction. State v. Cooper, 52 Ohio 
St.2d 163, 370 N.E.2d 725 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 US 911 (1978). Thus, a victim's death caused 
by fright or shock over an attempted burglary can be consid-
ered the proximate result of the burglary within the meaning 
of this statute. State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 491 
N.E.2d 379 (1985). This standard has been interpreted to 
mean that where a person sets in motion a sequence of 
events, the foreseeable consequences of which were known 
or should have been known to that person at the time, the 
person is criminally liable for the direct and reasonably in-
evitable consequence of death resulting from the original 
criminal act. State v. Chambers, 53 Ohio App.2d 266, 373 
N.E.2d 393 (1977). 
Lesser-Included-Offenses 
The primary difference between aggravated murder 
(felony-murder) and involuntary manslaughter (felony-
manslaughter) is that aggravated murder requires the pur-
pose to kill, while involuntary manslaughter requires only a 
death as the proximate result of a felony. State v. Campbell, 
69 Ohio St.3d 638, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 913 (1994). Accordingly, involuntary manslaughter 
is a lesser offense of aggravated murder if the jury finds that 
the defendant lacked the purpose to kill. State v. Scott, 61 
Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980) (defendant an aider 
and abettor); State v. Mabry, 5 Ohio App.3d 13, 449 N.E.2d 
16 (1982) (defendant a principal offender). 
Moreover, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the 
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, where 
there is evidence of the defendant's intoxication while com-
mitting an armed robbery and homicide because intoxica-
tion might lead a jury to conclude that the defendant did not 
act with the purpose to kill. State v. Young, No. C-830757 
(1st Dist. Ct. App., 5-14-86). An instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder is justified only when the jury can reasonably find 
against the.prosecution on the element of purpose and still 
find that the defendant's act proximately caused the death. 
State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 913 (1994). 
Recent Amendment 
R.C. 2903.02(8) now defines murder to also include a 
death that is the proximate result of the offender's commit-
ting or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a 
felony of the first or second degree and that is not a viola-
tion of R.C. 2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter) or R.C. 
2903.04 (involuntary manslaughter). An "offense of vio-
lence" is defined in R.C. 2901.01 (A)(9). The relationship be-
tween this type of murder and involuntary manslaughter is 
unclear. Which felonies for murder are not felonies for vol-
untary manslaughter? 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
Negligent homicide is defined as negligently causing the 
death of another by means of a deadly weapon or danger-
ous ordnance. See R.C. 2923.11 (A) ("Deadly weapon" de-
fined as "any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflict-
ing death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a 
weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon:'); 
R.C. 2923.11 (K) & (L) (defining "dangerous ordnance"). The 
legislative note explains: 
This section adds a new offense of homicide negligent-
ly committed, in which the instrumentality is a deadly 
weapon or dangerous ordnance ... Children are fre-
quently killed while playing with "unloaded" guns, and 
this section would apply to a person who, because of 
a substantial dereliction from due care, leaves a 
loaded firearm in a place where childish curiosity has 
a tragic result. Also, the hunter who fails to make sure 
of his target and kills someone, and the person who 
points a firearm in jest and kills the unfortunate at 
whom it is aimed, would be guilty of a violation of this 
section. Legislative Service Commission (1973). 
Actus Reus: Omissions 
As indicated by the above passage, a failure to take prop-
er precautions, where there is a legal duty to do so, satisfies 
the act requirement. As a general principle, the failure to act 
(an omission) cannot be the basis for criminal liability. The 
exception to this rule occurs in those cases where the com-
mon law judges found a "legal duty" to act. The Ohio statute 
recognizes this exception. R.C. 2901.21 (A)(1) ("liability is 
based on conduct which includes either a voluntary act, or 
an omission to perform an act or duty which he is capable of 
performing"). The statute, however, does not define the 
phrase "legal duty." Nevertheless, a fairly well-developed 
body of common law precedents have been decided. See 3 
Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law § 
85.4 (1996) (omission to act). 
Mens Rea 
The negligence required by the Criminal Code is not ordi-
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nary negligence but rather involves a substantial departure 
from due care. See State v. Lovejoy, 48 Ohio Misc. 20, 357 
N.E.2d 424 ( Muni., 1976). "Playfully" chasing others 
around a yard without checking to see if a gun is loaded 
· constitutes a substantial departure or lapse from due care. 
In re Jackson, 45 Ohio App.2d 243, 344 N.E.2d 162 (1975). 
A defendant who entered into a suicide pact with his girl-
friend was not guilty of negligent homicide after she killed 
herself with the defendant's gun; the legislative history does 
not indicate that the statute was intended to apply to assist-
ing, aiding, or abetting suicide, and the fact that the death 
was the result of a suicide pact provided a complete de-
fense. City of Akron v. Head, 73 Ohio Misc.2d 67, 657 
N.E.2d 1389 (Muni.,1995). 
VEHICULAR HOMICIDES 
Aggravated vehicular homicide, R.C. 2903.06, is defined 
as recklessly causing the death of another while operating a 
motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, water-
craft, or aircraft. The drafters observed: 
This section is roughly analogous to the former crime 
of first degree homicide by vehicle, but expands upon 
the former offense in two important respects. 
First, it covers recklessness with respect not only to 
motor vehicles, but also with respect to motorcycles, 
snowmobiles, locomotives, watercraft, and aircraft. 
Former law covered motor vehicles and watercraft, and 
also included a locomotive manslaughter provision 
which was unenforceable because the penalty was un-
certain. Second, the section does not predicate liabili-
ty on the violation of a safety statute, but on the whole 
spectrum of reckless conduct as defined in section 
2901.22. Former law made the offense dependent on 
a violation of the laws against drunk driving, reckless 
operation, and drag racing. Legislative Service 
Commission (1973): 
Vehicular homicide is a lesser included offense of aggra-
vated vehicular homicide. The two offenses are identical ex-
cept the culpable mental state for vehicular homicide is neg-
ligence, rather than recklessness. See Legislative Service 
Commission (1973). See also State v. Long, 7 Ohio App.3d 
248, 455 N.E.2d 534 (1983) (violation of a city ordinance, 
driving while intoxicated, is not a lesser included offense of 
aggravated vehicular homicide). 
Actus Reus 
. The culpable act is either (1) operating or (2) participating 
in the operation of the vehicle. "Participating" in the opera-
tion of the vehicle requires a strong common interest with 
the operator; the interest may not be too remote or passive. 
That interest is sufficient where the defendant participates in 
a crime and flees in a speeding vehicle recklessly driven by 
a person whom the defendant has good reason to believe is 
not a competent operator; the defendant may be an aider 
and abettor. State v. Hann, 55 Ohio App.2d 267, 380 N.E.2d 
1339 (1977). 
A survivor of a drag-race accident, whose only contribu-
tion to the death of the other participant was his own partici-
pation in the race, has not violated this statute. State v. 
Uhler, 61 Ohio Misc. 37, 402 N.E.2d 556 (C.P., 1979). 
Mens Rea 
The culpable mental state for aggravated vehicular homi-
cide is recklessness. Recklessness requires a known risk 
and the disregard of that risk. State v. Gates, 1 0 Ohio 
App.3d 265, 462 N.E.2d 425 (1983); State v. Dudock, 6 
Ohio App.3d 64, 453 N.E.2d 1124 (1983). See R.C. 
2901.22(C) ("A person acts recklessly when, with heedless 
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards 
a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain re-
sult or is likely to be of a certain nature:') 
In State v. Whitaker, 111 Ohio App.3d 608, 676 N.E.2d 
1189 (1996) (upholding conviction for vehicular homicide), 
the court of appeals indicated that excessive speed by itself 
is rarely sufficient to establish recklessness. The court 
cited: State v. Caudill, 11 Ohio App.3d 252, 464 N.E.2d 605 
(1983) (speed, erratic driving, driving under the influence); 
State v. Stinson, 21 Ohio App.3d 14, 486 N.E.2d 831 (1984) 
(speed, wet pavement, curving road, car in disrepair, driving 
under the influence). See also Akers v. Stirn, 136 Ohio St. 
245, 25 N.E.2d 286 (1940) (proof of excessive speed is not 
itself sufficient to constitute ''wantonness"); Morrow v. Hume, 
3 N.E.2d 39 (1936) (same); State v. Earlenbaugh, 18 Ohio 
St.3d 19, 21-22, 479 N.E.2d 846 (1985) (''wantonness" sub-
stantially similar to definition of "recklessness"). 
Driving a car under the influence of alcohol is reckless, 
State v. Stinson, 21 Ohio App.3d 14, 486 N.E.2d 831 
(1984), but the prosecution must prove the defendant's 
awareness of that risk. State v. Gates, 1 0 Ohio App.3d 265, 
462 N.E.2d 425 (1983). Operating a motor vehicle known to 
be unroadworthy is sufficiently reckless to support a convic-
tion for aggravated vehicular homicide; the defendant's vehi-
cle had a nonfunctioning brake, inadequate brakes on the 
remaining wheels, no emergency brake, a leaking master 
cylinder, and impaired steering. State v. Laub, 86 Ohio 
App.3d 517, 621 N.E.2d 585 (1993). 
The culpable mental state for vehicular homicide is negli-
gence. See R.C. 2901.22(0) ("A person acts negligently 
when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, he fails 
to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a cer-
tain result or may be of a certain nature:'). See also State v. 
Self, 112 Ohio App.3d 688, 693, 679 N.E.2d 1173 (1996) 
(definition in R.C. 2901.22(0) requires "a higher degree of 
negligence than ordinary negligence because it requires a 
substantial lack of due care. The determination of whether 
a lapse of due care is substantial is a question for the trier 
of fact:') (citing State v. Ovens, 44 Ohio App.2d 428, 430-31, 
339 N.E.2d 853 (1974)). 
Proximate Cause 
To prove vehicular homicide, the prosecution must estab-
lish that the death was proximately caused by the lack of 
due care. State v. Vaught, 56 Ohio St.2d 93, 382 N.E.2d 213 
(1978) (reversing conviction because of insufficient evi-
dence of "causal link between appellant's driving speed and 
the victim's death"). 
CAUSATION 
Most crimes are defined in terms of specific conduct, 
rather than in terms of a result. A few crimes, however, 
require a specific result. Homicide is the most important 
crime of this type; it requires that the accused cause death. 
See State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St.2d 151, 155,214 N.E.2d 417 
(1966) (''The state cannot, and does not, take issue with the 
proposition that a necessary element in a conviction of mur-
der in the first degree is that the death which resulted was 
proximately caused by something that was done by defen-
dant."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 874 (1966); State v. Cochrane, 
151 Ohio St. 128, 130, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) ("Causal con-
nection between the blow of the defendant and the death of 
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the decedent was an essential element of the proof to war-
rant conviction ... :').Other crimes, such as battery and 
arson also fall into this category. 
"With these crimes it is not enough for criminal liability 
that the defendant conduct himself with an intention to pro-
duce the specified result, or that he conduct himself in such 
a manner that he recklessly or negligently creates a risk of 
that result:' 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 
3.12(a), at 391 (1986). Where the defendant's conduct can-
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be the cause 
of death, the defendant must be acquitted. State v. Bynum, 
69 Ohio App. 317,43 N.E.2d 636 (1942). See also State v. 
Self, 112 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 679 N.E.2d 1173 (1996) 
(Testifying coroner did not conduct autopsy and autopsy re-
port not admitted: "In this instance, where the record clearly 
supports the conclusion that Osborne died from a head in-
jury caused by his collision with appellant's automobile, we 
find that the coroner's testimony concerning his observa-
tions at the scene of the accident are sufficient proof of the 
cause of death:'). 
There are two requirements for criminal culpability: (1) 
factual causation and (2) legal (proximate) causation. 
Factual Causation 
For factual causation, the accused must cause the spe-
cific result. A "but for" test is used in this context: "but for'' 
the conduct of the accused, the result would not have oc-
curred. For example, a husband who intentionally gives his 
wife a glass of wine in which he has added poison does not 
cause her death if she does not drink the wine but dies nat-
urally of a heart attack while holding the glass. It cannot be 
said that "but for'' his conduct his wife would be alive. The 
husband, however, could be convicted of attempted murder. 
See 3 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal 
Law ch. 93 (1996)(attempt). 
In State v. Burke, 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 404, 653 N.E.2d 
242 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1112 (1996), the Ohio 
Supreme Court considered a causation argument: "[T]here 
was testimony that McBride died as a result of being 
stabbed. The deputy coroner clearly stated that the victim's 
death was caused by an irregular beating of the heart as a 
result of all of the stab wounds to his body. Thus, the twelve 
stab wounds suffered by the victim collectively resulted in 
his heart failure and death:' 
See also State v. Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 468, 
688 N.E.2d 557 (1996) ("Appellant argues that if Pennington 
had not been speeding, the two never would have met in the 
intersection at the precise moment of the [fatal] collision. 
However, by the same token, if appellant had not run the 
stop sign, the accident never would have occurred. Since it 
cannot be said that the accident was the sole proximate re-
sult of Pennington's speed, it was not an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to exclude such evidence on the basis of 
relevancy:'); State v. Bynum, 69 Ohio App. 317, 321, 43 
N.E.2d 636 (1942) (victim died 188 days after assault) 
(''That the cause of death was meningitis, in the absence of 
any other testimony on the subject, we assume; but that the 
meningitis causing death was the result of any blow suffered 
on March 15th or thereabouts is not supported by any com-
petent evidence in the record."). 
In State v. Beaver, 119 Ohio App.3d 385, 392, 695 
N.E.2d 332 (1997), there was no direct evidence that the 
shooting caused the blood loss, organ failure, fluid in the 
lungs, and infection IJ.ecause the expert was not permitted 
to testify that the one caused the others. The court stated: 
"The cases in this area are in agreement that the state must 
produced evidence to support each link in the chain of cau-
sation between the defendant's criminal act and the eventu-
al death of the victim:· Nevertheless, the evidence of causa-
tion was sufficient: "There was circumstantial evidence 
... upon which the jury could have inferred that the shooting 
caused these complications. Butler was shot three times, 
once in his chest, an extremely vital portion of his body. 
Expert medical evidence is not necessary in cases where 
the injuries are severe enough that the jury can infer that the 
injuries caused the death:' ld. at 393 (citing State v. Carter, 
64 Ohio St.3d 218, 226, 594 N.E.2d 595 (1992)). 
Year-And-A-Day Rule 
The common law developed a special causation rule 
called the "year and a day" rule: a person could not be 
guilty of murder if the victim lived for a year and a day after 
the conduct that caused the injury. Ohio has abolished this 
rule. State v. Sandridge, 5 Ohio Op.3d 419, 365 N.E.2d 898 
(C.P., 1977) (holding that the retention of the year and a day 
rule is an anachronism). 
Proximate Causation: !n genera! 
While factual causation is necessary, alone it is insuffi-
cient for criminal liability. Legal or "proximate" causation is 
also required. Proximate causation issues arise when the 
injury to the victim occurs in an unintended manner. 1 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 3.12(c) (1986). 
See also State v. Ashenbener, No. 57900, 57901 (8th Dist. 
Ct. App., 2/7/91) (rejecting defendants' claim that victim's 
own drunkenness and stumbling over his boots was the 
cause of death rather than the blow to victim's head; invol-
untary manslaughter includes the doctrine of foreseeability). 
There are several tests to determine proximate causa-
tion. The common law typically specified that all "natural 
and probable" results are proximately caused. The foresee-
ability test provides that a person is criminally liable if the 
harm caused should have been foreseen as being reason-
ably related to his acts. The Model Penal Code provides 
that causation is established if "the actual result involves the 
same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplat-
ed and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to 
have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity 
of his offense:' Model Penal Code§ 2.03(2)(b). This is a 
variation on the foreseeability test. 
The test in Ohio is not whether a defendant should have 
foieseen the consequences, but whethei a ieasonable piu-
dent person in light of all the circumstances would have an-
ticipated the consequence. 4 Ohio Jury Instruction 
409.55(4); State v. Taylor, No. 65711 (8th Dist. Ct. App., 
11/9/95). See also State v. Burchfield, 66 Ohio St.3d 
261 ,611 N.E.2d 819 (1993) ("The O.J.I. foreseeability in-
struction should be given most cautiously in future murder 
cases:'). 
Proximate Causation: Acts of Nature 
Most acts of nature sever the causal relationship be-
tween the accused's act and the victim's death. Assume that 
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a person drives negligently .. To avoid that person's s~erving 
car, another driver takes a different route home and IS stuck 
by lightning and dies. The fact that lightning struck is a 
mere coincidence and breaks the causal connection. 
Proximate Causation: Acts by Third Party 
Assume the defendant intends to kill another but merely 
wounds the victim. Assume further that the victim receives 
negligent medical treatment at a hospital and dies. Despite 
improvements in medical care, negligent care remains a 
foreseeable risk. "In short, mere negligence in medical 
treatment is not so abnormal that the defendant should be 
freed of liability:' 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law §3.12(f)(5), at 409 (1986). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has also said that medical 
treatment for homicide victims is not an intervening cause. 
State v. Carter, 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 938 (1993); State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio 
St.2d 35, 40, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978). See also State v. 
Beaver, 119 Ohio App.3d 385, 394, 695 N.E.2d 332 (1997) 
("Assuming arguendo that the infection was, in fact, caused 
by the negligence of the attending surgeons, this alone is 
not sufficient to break the chain of direct causation. The in-
juries inflicted by the defendant need not be the sole cause 
of death:'). 
However, if the victim dies due to gross, wilful mistreat-
ment, the defendant would not be the legal cause of the 
death. State v. Jamison, No. 3-89-24, 3-89-25 (3rd Dist. Ct. 
App., 1/9/91) (medical treatment not intervening cause 
where hospital-acquired pneumonia was the result of treat-
ment and therapy for the burns caused by the defendants). 
Proximate Causation: Acts by Victims 
Assume that "A approaches B with a deadly weapon and 
a murderous intent to kill, so that B, in order to escape, 
'voluntarily' jumps out a window:' 1 LaFave & Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law§ 3.12(f)(4), at 407 (1986). A is 
criminally liable for the death of B. Because such instinctive 
acts to avoid a possible harm are normal, A is the legal or 
proximate cause of the consequences. 
In State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St.2d 151, 155, 214 N.E.2d 
417 (1966), the victim while hospitalized from the beating 
(May 5) fell out of bed and fractured her cheekbone and · 
jawbone (May 9). She suddenly died on May 20 as she was 
about to be discharged. The cause of death was a massive 
pulmonary embolism (blood clot in the lungs), but the ex-
perts varied as to whether the beating received by the de-
ceased on May 5 was the proximate cause of death. The 
Court upheld the conviction, noting: "[T]he records undeni-
ably show that deceased died from a massive pulmonary 
embolism, that the embolism could form in any person if 
that person were confined in bed, that deceased would not 
have been likely to develop the embolism that took her life if 
she had not been so restricted to bed, and that deceased 
was so confined as a direct result of the injuries she re-
ceived on May 5, 1963:' 
